As a source and the Norwegian broadcaster NRK discovered, the Norwegian company Ro Marine, which issued false insurance policies for numerous vessels, acted in the interests of the Russian authorities.

The forged documents were intended for vessels involved in NOVATEK’s liquefied natural gas export and military cargo transportation projects, as well as for a Rosneft partner and an organization from the United Arab Emirates linked to a "shadow fleet" whose activities are opaque.

The tanker Naxos approached the English Channel in mid-June 2025 and shut down its engine. Proceeding further toward Russia was dangerous, as the ship risked being detained in European waters. The Panamanian-flagged vessel moored in the Indian port of Sikka in late May, transited the Suez Canal two weeks later, and was now heading to the Baltic to load another shipment of Russian oil. After waiting in English waters for several days, the tanker Sierra and another companion, the corvette Boykiy, joined the Naxos. On June 20, the convoy entered the English Channel. They were met by the British destroyer HMS Duncan off the island of Ouesant. The Royal Navy destroyer maintained close contact with the Russian convoy for the next 24 hours, and on June 21, it was relieved by the patrol ship HMS Mersey.

Until recently, it was hard to imagine that a commercial voyage would result in a standoff between warships, but Russian authorities have good reason to fear that European countries could interfere with oil exports that violate sanctions. For example, in mid-May, Estonia attempted to detain a "shadow fleet" tanker, and an Su-35 was dispatched to its aid. To avoid similar incidents, Russia began using its navy for security, which prompted European naval forces to respond. As a result, a routine voyage is turning into a special operation involving warships, helicopters, and drones. MOSCOW STREETS REPORTS THIS

A Royal Navy ship escorts a Russian convoy, June 2025. Source: royalnavy.mod.uk

But the tankers escorted by the Boykiy had every reason to worry that they might indeed be denied passage through the English Channel. Both vessels were under sanctions, and Naxos also had paperwork issues that EU officials might have known about: the last known insurance policy at the time was issued by the Norwegian company Ro Marine. In late March 2025, NRK and Danwatch revealed that the company did not have an insurance license, and the license it supposedly received from Norway’s Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet) was fake. This means that none of Ro Marine’s insurance policies were valid, so in the event of an accident involving the tanker, European authorities would not be able to receive compensation for the environmental impact. The scale of the fraud is impressive: experts interviewed by the publications noted that isolated cases of document forgery had previously been known, but Ro Marine issued policies for at least 256 ships, including 76 tankers that are part of Russia’s "shadow fleet."

The sole owner of Ro Marine is Andrey Mochalin, a native of St. Petersburg. The Dossier Center, together with NRK, gained access to the banking records of Mochalin’s Russian structure, through which the policies were sold, and confirmed that the scam was impossible without the tacit consent of the Russian authorities, at the very least. Among the main beneficiaries of this scheme are systemically important Russian companies: NOVATEK and Rosneft.

Andrey Mochalin. Source: Dossier Center.

Alternative solutions

"The sanctions plans are beginning to resemble a naval blockade. These measures will be met with an adequate and proportionate response from our side. If diplomatic or legal instruments fail, our Navy will be ready to ensure the safety of Russian shipping. Hotheads in London or Brussels need to understand this clearly," warned Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s aide and one of his key allies, in April 2025. He left the Security Council in 2024 and has since been responsible for the fleet—both military and merchant.

This focus on maritime issues is no coincidence. Russian hydrocarbon exports are a key source of revenue for the country’s budget, which is now in its fourth year of a full-scale conflict. Sanctions against this sector of the economy have been introduced slowly and do not cover all key segments. The United States acted most decisively, imposing an embargo on energy supplies from Russia. By the end of 2022, Europe joined the United States: in December, an embargo on Russian oil supplies to the EU by sea came into effect, followed by an embargo on petroleum products in February 2023, with the United Kingdom subsequently approving similar measures. Simultaneously, the European Union, Australia, and the G7 (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) agreed on price caps for Russian resources destined for third countries: $60 per barrel of oil, $100 for premium petroleum products (such as gasoline and kerosene), and $45 for discounted products (fuel oil).

The regime was intended to operate through control at the transportation stage: a tanker could only be chartered and insured if the oil sales were within the "ceiling." Separate sanctions packages cover LNG projects and the vessels transporting cargo for them or exporting liquefied gas.

Vladimir Putin issued a decree prohibiting compliance with the restrictions, and so far Russia has largely managed to cope by creating a "shadow fleet." While there is no single definition, the term typically refers to ships that deliberately violate Western sanctions. These are often older vessels, their owners and operators are registered in opaque jurisdictions, their beneficial owners are kept secret, and the ships frequently change flags and disable their AIS, the system that allows for tracking of shipping movements and, consequently, calls at Russian ports.

Vladimir Putin and Nikolai Patrushev, June 2017. Source: kremlin.ru

Finding a vessel that you wouldn’t mind scrapping if sanctioned and registering it in a country that doesn’t strictly enforce all the restrictions is relatively easy. Finding a company willing to insure the ship is more challenging, as such a firm must ensure the vessel is safe and that the delivery complies with the "ceiling." Ninety percent of global shipping is covered by organizations that are members of the International Group of Mutual Insurance Clubs, and they comply with the sanctions. Therefore, other options had to be explored for the "shadow fleet."

The insurance issue is so important that it was repeatedly discussed at meetings attended by the president. Putin received updates on the situation from Andrei Belousov, then First Deputy Prime Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, who oversaw the energy sector. The head of state himself repeatedly stated that by imposing restrictions, "the West merely spurred the development of alternative solutions, alternative logistics, insurance, international payment systems, and technological innovation."

"Alternative insurance" is a misleading term, as such schemes resemble fraud. A standard policy provides coverage in the event of an oil spill, a vessel accident, or a crew casualty. The documents received by Russian suppliers merely facilitated inspection and entry into European waters. For example, Russia’s Ingosstrakh stated in contracts that it reserved the right to cancel policies for vessels found selling oil at a price above the "ceiling." As a result, European authorities, having received the vessel’s paperwork for inspection, allow the ship to proceed, seeing that it has valid insurance coverage. However, in the event of an accident, the insurance will be invalid, rendering it meaningless.

But at least Ingosstrakh is a genuine insurance company, while Ro Marine is a sham. And it wasn’t just its insurance policies that were fake. To obtain permission from Panamanian authorities to begin working with vessels flying that country’s flag, Ro Marine provided officials with documents indicating that a similar approval had already been issued by another country, Sierra Leone. However, as the country’s maritime administration told NRK, the document was forged: it was issued by an entirely different insurer.

In an attempt to determine whose interests Ro Marine was acting in, Dossier gained access to financial documents of Hydor St. Petersburg, a Russian entity owned by Andrey Mochalin. These documents show that payments for Ro Marine insurance policies were processed through its accounts, with the transfer details listing the numbers of the certificates issued by the Norwegian organization and the names of the insured ships. Dossier also has access to the policies themselves. In some cases, Hydor received the funds indirectly, through an intermediary—an insurance broker.

Ships with forged documents list dozens of legal entities as their operators. Despite this diversity, Dossier and NRK were able to identify several groups of vessels that are of particular interest to Russian authorities.

Oil, gas, weapons

The 160-meter heavy-lift vessels Nan Feng Zhi Xing and Hunter Star departed from the port of Zhoushan in eastern China at the end of September 2024. On board were the onshore power plant for Arctic LNG 2, Russia’s flagship liquefied natural gas project, which the United States has targeted with sanctions under the Biden administration. This delay has delayed the launch of the LNG lines, making it extremely difficult to obtain the already-built LNG carriers, and ships carrying equipment for the plant, fearing potential consequences, even turned around and left Russian waters without delivering the equipment.

The Nan Feng Zhi Xing and Hunter Star reached their destination. Neither bad weather, nor the end of navigation on the Northern Sea Route, nor the ice that had begun to form early in the waters hindered their progress. The ships returned to China via a less extreme route – along the coast of Norway, through the English Channel, and then around Africa; in early January 2025, they passed the Cape of Good Hope. For navigation in European waters, the heavy-duty vessels required insurance. The policies were obtained through the insurance broker SB Logika, the funds were deposited into the account of Hydor St. Petersburg, and the certificates themselves were issued by Ro Marine.

Hunter Star near Vladivostok, October 2024

The production and export of liquefied natural gas has occupied Vladimir Putin for many years. He is negotiating with foreign partners to launch plants and build gas carriers, opening new lines, and could personally earn over $1.1 billion reselling shares in Yamal LNG, currently Russia’s largest project. The president has no plans to stop, despite the sanctions that are hitting this sector specifically: "Are they hindering us or not? They are. Are they creating problems? They are. Will they be able to shut it all down and kill us completely? No, they won’t. They will cause us some damage and harm, but we will certainly emerge from this situation, just as we have from other energy supply issues."

Yamal LNG is NOVATEK’s first large-scale liquefied natural gas project. Located on the Yamal Peninsula, its co-owners include France’s TotalEnergies (20.015%) and the Chinese government (CNPC, the China National Petroleum Corporation, holds 20.015%, while the remaining 9.8971% is held by the Silk Road Fund). A second large-scale project, Arctic LNG 2, is located 70 km from the plant on the Gydan Peninsula. NOVATEK owns 60%, with the remaining stake equally divided between TotalEnergies, China’s CNPC and CNOOC, and a consortium of Japan’s Mitsui and JOGMEC. Neither the plants nor Russian LNG imports are subject to EU sanctions; restrictions apply only to certain aspects of production and logistics. For example, in June 2024, Europe banned the supply of goods, technologies and services to Arctic LNG 2.

Norwegian company Ro Marine is helping the Russian authorities and NOVATEK overcome sanctions. The company, without a license, fictitiously insured not only heavy-duty trucks delivering equipment for Arctic LNG 2 but also gas carriers: policies were issued to the North Air, North Mountain, North Way, and North Sky carriers, all built in South Korea in 2023-2024, which transported gas from NOVATEK’s plants.

Ro Marine insurance for the North Air vessel. Source: Dossier Center

In December 2024, they were subject to EU sanctions, changed their names to Buran, Voskhod, Zarya, and Iris, and their formal owners were changed. The documents now list the companies Angara, Igarka, Kantat, and Elegest as owners, with 46-year-old Oleg Shishanov as their beneficiary. He is likely the nominal owner, as until recently he had only worked as a security guard. The tankers continue to service NOVATEK projects. For example, according to ship documents, the Iris was at the Utrenny terminal of the Arctic LNG 2 plant awaiting loading at the end of June 2025, and departed on June 29 with 65,000 tons of LNG on board.

Cargo delivery for NOVATEK plants was also carried out using Ro Marine documents. In 2023, the vessel Lahta transported goods for Arctic LNG 2, insured by a Norwegian company. The vessel’s operator was the Lithuanian company Tarron Operating, and its beneficiary was Sergei Karchemov. His son, Artem Karchemov, is a partner at the EPAM law firm, founded by Putin’s classmate, Nikolai Egorov. Another ship, managed by the Lithuanian company Sogdiana, carried cargo between Turkey and Sevastopol in 2024 and was likely dismantled by the end of the year. The vessel also had counterfeit Norwegian insurance.

NOVATEK’s LNG projects are located in the Arctic zone. Pola Rise, a company believed to be founded by former Deputy Transport Minister Viktor Olersky, and its entire fleet of more than twenty ships were sanctioned by the United States for shipping cargo, including to the Arctic. US officials did not specify the specific destinations for the goods transported by the company. At least five ships were insured by Ro Marine.

But Tarron Operating isn’t just about LNG projects. In 2024, the vessel Lahta departed from the St. Petersburg port of Bronka for Tartus, Syria, where a Russian naval base was located at the time.

Ro Marine insurance for the ship Lahta. Source: Dossier Center

And this is likely no coincidence. Dossier discovered that Ro Marine documents were used by several other vessels and legal entities associated with the Russian military.

• MG-Flot transferred 900,000 rubles to Khaidor (the Russian recipient of payments for Ro Marine policies). The company is subject to EU sanctions for its involvement in the delivery of Iranian weapons to Russia.
• Nautilus Insurance Consultants paid Khaidor 430,000 rubles. One of the company’s owners, Nikita Minin, is linked to the GRU, according to Bellingcat and The Insider.
• Ro Marine insured the Agattu, a vessel that sailed from St. Petersburg in mid-June 2025 with a cargo of ammunition destined for Algeria, until January 2025. The insurance policy for the vessel was paid for by the broker SB Logika.

Liquefied natural gas and military cargo aren’t the only sectors where counterfeit Ro Marine certificates were used. Financial documents from Haydor St. Petersburg indicate that the company actively served the Russian oil sector.

Hydor St. Petersburg received the largest amount of money in 2024 from the Dubai-based firm Adele Shipping and Freight DMCC—almost 70 million rubles. The company was registered in the UAE in late 2022. Like most legal entities in the UAE, it does not disclose its beneficiaries and provides very limited information about its activities on its website. Nevertheless, Dossier found three vessels linked to Adele Shipping and Freight. One of them received fuel for refueling in the St. Petersburg port of Ust-Luga, with the Dubai company paying for the bunkering. The Dubai company also paid for services for two tankers in a Brazilian port in late 2024 and early 2025. Two of the three ships—Tasta and Vayu 1—were insured by Ro Marine, with one policy valid until the end of April 2026.

Ro Marine insurance for the ship Tasta. Source: Dossier Center

Another major partner of Hydor St. Petersburg is Bellatrix Energy, which transferred 18.1 million rubles to the Russian organization’s accounts. The Hong Kong company sharply increased its exports of Russian oil and petroleum products after the introduction of the price cap and was subject to US sanctions in December 2023. Bellatrix Energy is believed to be part of the Coral Energy group (currently 2Rivers), founded in 2010 by Azerbaijani businessman Tahir Garayev. Four years later, he hired a man named Etibar Eyyub, who, like Garayev, developed a trusting relationship with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. Eyyub accompanied Sechin to negotiations in Qatar, and they also spent time together at a hunting lodge in Tula. Following the outbreak of the conflict, Coral and its associated organizations became key exporters of the Russian company’s oil, and one of the group’s alleged legal entities, Nord Axis, bought out the trader Trafigura’s stake in Rosneft’s Vostok Oil project.

The Naxos tanker’s voyage, which began in Sikka, India, at the end of May and continued under the escort of the corvette Boykiy, concluded safely in Ust-Luga. The ship’s captain provided the port administration with a new set of documents. These documents indicated that the ship was now named Selva, was flying the Palau flag, and was no longer insured by Ro Marine, but by the Russian company Soglasie. With these documents in place, the ship departed Primorsk on July 3, loading oil. Its destination was once again Sikka.

The Norwegian company, however, has not ceased operations. Dossier found several insurance policies issued after the scandal. The most recent document is dated April 24, 2025, and is valid for one year. Ships with counterfeit insurance can still be found in European ports. For example, the Astra, a dredging vessel insured by Ro Marine, was in the port of Riga undergoing repairs from mid-February until at least the end of August 2025. The ship is part of the fleet of the Bureau of Marine Projects and Technologies, which carries out work in the port of Ust-Luga on behalf of the Novotrans Group.

Fleet insurance is a matter of national importance, overseen by one of the president’s closest allies, Nikolai Patrushev. The clients of the fictitious insurance company include Russia’s largest oil and gas holdings, controlled by Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, their intermediaries created specifically to circumvent sanctions, firms that supplied weapons to Defense Ministry units, and even an organization linked to the GRU. Could they all have believed they were purchasing genuine insurance certificates? Theoretically, it’s possible. But, as an NRK source who purchased a policy from Ro Marine says, "everyone knew" the company was fake. In any case, Rosneft, Novatek, and others are unlikely to feel cheated: the policies were needed to circumvent sanctions, and this service was provided in full.

Months after the scandal, Andrey Mochalin continues to manage his Russian company. He has not responded to questions sent to him via email, numerous phone calls, and instant messages.

Author: Maria Sharapova

Источник: https://echelon-tribune.com/component/k2/item/215437