Washington D.C., May 31, 2008 – Twenty years ago today, President Ronald Reagan declared the end of the Cold War while walking through Red Square and the Kremlin in Moscow during a summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that was friendly and largely ceremonial, according to the previously secret summit transcripts published today on the Web by the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org).

Asked by a reporter on the Kremlin grounds May 31, 1988 about the famous “evil empire” speech of 1983, Reagan responded, “I was talking about another time, another era.” The underlying documents from the summit, obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests in the U.S. and from the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow, show that Gorbachev was thwarted in his efforts for rapid arms control progress by lack of trust on the U.S. side, and that the “human factor” reflected in Reagan’s comments was the most important outcome of the summit.

The documents include the official U.S. transcripts of the face-to-face meetings in Moscow between Reagan and Gorbachev, the President’s briefing book for the summit (prepared by the State Department), notes from Soviet Politburo sessions before and after the summit (taken by Gorbachev aide Anatoly Chernyaev), the U.S. National Security Decision Directives leading up to the summit, and the talking points sent to U.S. embassies around the world after the summit.

The Web publication on the Moscow summit is the fourth in the National Security Archive’s series of online briefing books posting key U.S. and Soviet documents on each of the Reagan-Gorbachev meetings (Geneva 1985, Reykjavik 1986, Washington 1987, and coming in December, New York 1988).


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1) Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, February 22, 1988 [Excerpt published by the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow]

This conversation provides a unique snapshot of the global nature of the U.S.-Soviet competition and of Gorbachev’s conviction that all the “painful knots that have built up around the world” could be resolved if the Soviet Union and the United States made a genuine cooperative effort to settle those regional conflicts. Among the regional conflicts discussed are those in Angola, Cambodia, the Iran-Iraq War, the Middle East and most significantly Afghanistan. On February 8, 1988, Gorbachev had announced that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan starting in May and would be completely gone by spring 1989 – an outcome that the top CIA officials Robert Gates and Fritz Ermarth had bet $25 and $50, respectively, would never happen.[1] Here, Gorbachev presses Shultz to move on finalizing the Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan and speedy signing of the accords to provide a model of superpower cooperation in settlement of regional conflicts, and to ensure that Afghanistan could become a neutral non-aligned country. Gorbachev and Shultz also discuss U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the U.N. Security Council on the Iran-Iraq war. Both express their concern about the fundamentalist government in Iran and the Iranian factor in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Concerned about the Iranian influence, Shultz suggests jokingly that “the Iranians would not mind fundamentalist governments in the Kremlin and Washington.” From this conversation, one could get a sense how profoundly the U.S.-Soviet relations changed by early 1988, when both sides seem to be ready to work together on the issues where the differences and interests previously appeared irreconcilable. This excerpt released by the Gorbachev Foundation does not include the discussion on strategic weapons and missile defense, which took place in the first part of the meeting. At the time, Shultz and the Soviets both are pushing for a START agreement to be ready by the time of the Moscow summit.

2) Politburo Session, February 25, 1988 [Excerpt from notes of Anatoly Chernyaev]

Gorbachev informs the Politburo about his conversations with Secretary of State Shultz. The tone of the report is very upbeat and optimistic. At this point Gorbachev still strongly believes that it would be possible to prepare the START treaty on 50% reductions of strategic nuclear weapons by the time of the Moscow summit and sign it while Reagan is still in office. In 1987, that hope of reaching a fast agreement on strategic weapons reductions drove many of Soviet concessions in the INF negotiations, and the two leaders had agreed at the Washington summit in December 1987 to move quickly to a START agreement. Gorbachev sees a window of opportunity for arms control because “because politically we have entered a new situation in our relationship with the United States.” The Soviet leader directly links the success of perestroika to deep reductions in military spending while keeping basic parity with the United States. He speaks strongly about the need to revise the Soviet military budget to rein in defense spending. Yet on this very day in Washington, President Reagan tells editors of the Washington Post that time is too short to reach agreement on START by the time of the summit, in effect ratifying the go-slow views of his new national security team, most of whom (notably Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and national security adviser Colin Powell) remained skeptical of Gorbachev’s intentions, although not as hostile as the departed hard-liners Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle. Shultz was taken by surprise and dismayed at the shift, which undercut his efforts that Gorbachev is talking about here.[2]

3) Politburo Session, March 10, 1988 [Excerpt from notes of Anatoly Chernyaev]

Gorbachev informs the Politburo about his conversations with U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Carl Levin and talks between Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov. Disappointed but still somewhat hopeful on START, Gorbachev points out that the focus of arms control is now shifting toward reductions of conventional weapons in Europe. This document reflects the Soviet leader’s decision to move seriously on the issue of the military imbalance in Europe—which would eventually produce the startling announcement of deep Soviet unilateral cuts in December 1988 in Gorbachev’s U.N. speech. Here he calls the Politburo to “prepare the cards,” which he is going to “put on the table” later taking into account proposals brought by the U.S. Senators and those developed in European social democratic circles.

4) National Security Council Memorandum of Conversation, NSC Meeting with Suzanne Massie, March 11, 1988. [Reagan Library declassification, FOIA request]

The author and Russian culture expert Suzanne Massie would meet with President Reagan some 21 times in four years, starting in early 1984 at the time of Reagan’s conciliatory “Ivan and Anya” speech. The Massie conversations would educate the President about Russian culture and attitudes, encouraging him to seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union, as well as provide an informal back channel between the White House and Soviet intellectuals. Here, the back channel includes an official message from “even higher” levels in Moscow asking whether Reagan still believed the USSR to be the “evil empire” and if not, to make such a statement before the summit.

5) Conference with Politburo Members, March 21, 1988 [Excerpt from notes of Anatoly Chernyaev]

Gorbachev again briefly mentions the recent visits of U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Carl Levin, and Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci to Moscow. He notes that his conversation with the Senators was “one of the most substantive conversations” and points to expanding possibilities that the meeting signified. The General Secretary is very impressed with the depth and sincerity of talks between Carlucci and Soviet Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov. In both conversations the “human factor” played a great role, just as in Gorbachev’s own meetings with President Reagan. The Soviet leader sounds slightly surprised that interactions with Reagan’s supporters could be so productive.

6) National Security Decision Directive No. 304, “Organizing for the Moscow Summit,” April 19, 1988. [NSC declassification, FOIA request]

This Directive provides the wiring diagram for the bureaucratic process in the U.S. government leading up to the summit, including authorizing the various policy groups and coordination mechanisms. Ultimately, the U.S. delegation to Moscow would include more than 700 officials.

7) Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “The Secretary’s Initial Meeting with Shevardnadze,” April 21, 1988 [State Department declassification, FOIA request]

This State Department memorandum of conversation records the third set of negotiations between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister leading up to the Moscow summit (February in Moscow, March in Washington, now April back in Moscow). Shevardnadze presses for progress on START, but Shultz responds that still-unresolved issues like sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) would not “reach full closure during the next month,” so agreement is unlikely for the summit. (Arguments over these nuclear-armed cruise missiles would hold up START negotiations for years, pushed by the parochial interests of the U.S. Navy rather than a consideration of the national interest, but by 1991 their lack of strategic value would lead to President George H. W. Bush’s unilateral decision to withdraw all tactical nukes from U.S. ships.[3]) The bulk of the discussion here concerns human rights issues, including an interesting exchange about the Vienna follow-up meeting on the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE). Shultz raises his “disappointment with the performance of the Soviet delegation” at Vienna, which “was not prepared to go as far in its statements as what the Soviet leadership was saying in Moscow.” Shevardnadze responds, “We have a hard delegation” in Vienna, we tell them one thing, “They do something different.”

8) National Security Decision Directive No. 305, “Objectives at the Moscow Summit," April 26, 1988. [NSC declassification, FOIA request]

This Directive sets out the Reagan administration’s goals for the summit, and provides an interesting contrast to Gorbachev’s and Shevardnadze’s eagerness to negotiate strategic arms control and conventional forces reductions. The American side explicitly seeks only to “consolidate the gains” on the standard four-part agenda including human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral relations and arms control, although there is a rhetorical commitment to “attainment as soon as possible of a START agreement” (it would not happen until 1991, and even then, only bring U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons down to about the level where they were when START negotiations began in 1982). The continuing caution and skepticism on the U.S. side is reflected in the warning against “exaggerated expectations on the future pace and achievement of U.S.-Soviet relations or the reform process under way in the Soviet Union” – a stark contrast to the possibilities envisioned by the Soviet leader, and even by Reagan himself at the Reykjavik summit only a year and a half earlier.

9) Memorandum of Conversation, Colin Powell and Ambassador Dubinin, April 29, 1988. [Reagan Library declassification, FOIA request]

The Soviet ambassador to Washington, Yuri Dubinin, calls on President Reagan’s national security adviser to “see if the United States had a concept of the President’s visit to Moscow.” Powell responds that Reagan anticipates “no major problems” and “no surprise[s]” but simply seeks “to learn about the Soviet Union and about its people” – underlining the largely ceremonial purpose of the summit as seen from the U.S. side. Dubinin brings up the sea-launched cruise missile issue again to no avail, and on issues from ABM to Central America, the two officials simply agree to disagree. Powell seeks to reassure the Soviets about various Reagan speeches earlier in the spring that seemed to gloat about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and take credit for pressuring Moscow – to which the Soviets had taken offense, most directly when Gorbachev himself confronted Shultz only a week earlier in Moscow. Powell remarks again “we each have many different constituencies, and that one should not look at what the President said from place to place in the United States, but reread the speeches, toasts and statements he had issued during the Washington Summit.”

10) Department of State, Background Book, “President Reagan’s Meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, May 29-June 2, 1988.” [State Department declassification, FOIA request]

This remarkable 70-page briefing book prepared by the State Department for President Reagan provides a detailed point-by-point review of practically every issue in U.S.-Soviet relations from human rights to fisheries, from START to terrorism, and from the long-planned Kiev consulate to the unrest in the Soviet national republics. The format lends itself to the kind of quick review and annotation that the President preferred: bullet points, short summary memos, talking point outlines of the U.S. and Soviet positions, and tangible examples that could be used by speechwriters and on the index cards that Reagan always carried for his sessions with Gorbachev. According to the drafting dates on the various memos, State Department officials drafted them starting in early April 1988 and continuing through mid-May, though the final compilation is clearly complete by the time the President and the Secretary of State leave Washington on May 25. Substantively, perhaps the most remarkable assertion in this package is the summary near the end of “Soviet Foreign Policy Trends.” Reflecting the cautious and still-conflicted view in the Washington establishment, the memo asserts that “Gorbachev’s primary foreign policy objective has been to achieve stability and predictability in foreign relations, in order to create breathing room for domestic reforms.” In fact, as the now-available Politburo records and Chernyaev diaries show, Gorbachev’s aim is to abolish nuclear weapons and end the Cold War in Europe, leading him to initiatives the ostrich-like U.S. officials never predicted, like the unilateral reductions in Soviet troops he would announce at the United Nations at the end of 1988.

11) Department of State, Moscow Summit Overview (undated, circa May 23, 1988). [State Department declassification, FOIA request]

This 2-page overview apparently prepared just before the President’s departure from Washington provides the State Department’s main talking points about the summit. The memo in effect keeps the government’s spokespeople on the same page (or 2 pages, as the case may be), emphasizing that “Moscow should be where the dialogue catches its second wind, not be seen as its high-water mark.”

12) Department of State Memorandum, “Summit Briefing Book for Mrs. Reagan,” May 23, 1988. [Reagan Library declassification, FOIA request]

This cover memo from the State Department to the national security adviser conveys the materials for Mrs. Reagan’s briefing book, of which only the 2-page table of contents and the two scope papers (“Moscow Summit” and “Recent Developments in the Soviet Union”) are currently available. The table of contents provides a succinct overview of the schedule, including Mrs. Reagan’s quick visit to Leningrad; and the scope papers similarly give concise summaries of U.S. expectations for the summit (“the first [visit] by an American president in fourteen years”) and U.S. analysis of Gorbachev’s situation, including “recent high-level challenges to his authority.” This last phrase refers to the so-called Nina Andreeva affair, when a Leningrad chemistry teacher published on March 13 a striking anti-reform message titled “I Cannot Betray My Principles” while Gorbachev was out of the country – a publication that would not have happened without backing from conservatives like Ligachev on the Politburo. It would take three weeks before the new thinkers would marshal their response in the form of a full-page Pravda rebuttal.


President and Mrs. Reagan shaking hands on the Arbat, May 29, 1988. [Photo courtesy of Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California]

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