Больше двух, ето уже закономерность ... машина снова попала в аварию
Пора менять, несчастливая она какая то

Из Рунета

Причина кризиса 2008 года - за много-много лет до него...
Размышлял о истоках нынешнего кризиса. И нашел их.

Понятно, что в основе нынешнего кризиса неограниченная кредитная экспансия.
Ипотечники в США понабрали субпраймов.
Фонды прямых инвестиций выкупали компании за десятки миллиардов в кредит под залог этих же компаний.
Хедж-фонды арбитрировали все, что движется с таким плечом, которое раньше только в форексных салонах было.
Даже правительство США устроило войнушку в свое удовольствие в госдолг немыслимых доселе размеров.
То же и у нас: олигархи в кредит скупали компании, инвестбанки - акции, граждане - жилье и машины. Словом, всему виной дешевый кредит. Как его не стало, все сжалось, и пошел "эффект музыкальных стульев".

Но откуда взялся дешевый кредит? Кто виноват?
А виноват Гринспен, это он ставку с 2000 по 2003 опустил в ноль.

Но зачем Гринспен это сделал?
А он боролся с рецессией, которую вызвали падение Энрона и прочих компаний, которые мухлевали все 1990-е с отчетностью.

А зачем же компании мухлевали?
А им советы директоров и акционеры говорили - посмотрите, как интернет-компании прут вовсе без прибыли и продаж! Прибыль каждый квартал больше давай, свои акции покупай давай, курс накручивай давай! И едва интернет-компании обвалились...

Почему ж интернет-компании поперли?
А это оттого, что вся экономика стагнировала, и такого случая ради ставки срезали, в венчурные фонды деньги пришли... Как ставки выросли - тут интернет-компании и посыпались, а за ними и энроны покатились под гору, 9-11 только все докончил.

А почему же ставки в начале 1990-х были низкие?
Это так с рецессией боролись. Была противная долгая рецессия, ничего не помогало.

Откуда же рецессия?
А фондовый рынок обвалился, да еще до кучи все компании финансировались через джанк-бонды, на которые рейдеры компании перехватывали, бонды им Майкл Милкен делал, а деньги на те джанк-бонды давали ссудно-сберегательные ассоциации, которые почти не регулировались, вот они и воротили что хотели. И в целом на рынке был бум инвестиций.

Кто ж такие бонды и ссудно-сберегательные ассоциации нагородил? Неужели Милкен?
Нет, он только ситуацией воспользовался. А дерегулировал экономику Рональд Рейган. Да еще Пол Волкер помог - ставки сперва взинтил до неба, а потом опустил, деньги и хлынули рекой.

Что ж Рейган и Волкер с ума спятили?
Ничего подобного - они с жесточайшей стагфляцией боролись. А случилась эта стагфляция из-за того, что арабы ввели нефтяное эмбарго и цены на нефть подняли до небес (по тем временам).

Зачем же арабы это эмбарго сделали?
Они таким образом боролись с Израилем, который им задницу надрал в 1967 и 1973 годах.

Получается, Израиль всю эту кашу заварил?
Да нет, тогда уж виноваты англичане, которые еще в 1916 году пообещали израильтян переселить в Палестину, где израильтяне не жили почти два тысячелетия, а полтора на их месте жили арабы. Как спорам не быть, когда на одной территории два соседа.

Таким образом, все бы обошлось, живи евреи в Израиле безвылазно... Но ведь они ж не сами из Израиля ушли. А их выгнал древнеримский император Адриан в 132 году. Потому что евреи устроили восстание Бар-Кохбы, и с того восстания и начались два тысячелетия диаспоры.

Что ж евреи с Адрианом не поладили?
А дело в том, что Адриан Иерусалим переименовал в свою честь и на руинах второго храма поставил статую своего малолетнего любовника Антиноя, которому велел поклоняться как богу. Лучше религиозные чувства иудеям он отдавить бы не смог.

Почему ж Адриан такую поразительную вещь учудил?
Дело в том, что у него настроение было отвратительное. В том самом году они с Антиноем в Египет поехали - и Антиной утонул в Ниле. Адриан его обожествил, велел по всей империи ему статуи поставить, даже созвездие Орла в его честь переименовал. Он на иудеях сорвал злость по полной!

Итак, мы нашли причину кризиса. Антиной!

Вот так, весь мир рушится - и все из-за одного <censored> !

Чтоб ему пусто было! Не мог аккуратнее купаться!

Про деривативы:
Паштет из рябчиков с добавлением конины. Пропорции 1:1 (один рябчик: один конь)

Про брокеров и фондовый рынок

1. Джон Смит, выпрыгнувший из окна 75-го этажа на Уолл Стрит, после
удара о землю подпрыгнул на 10 метров, чем немного отыграл свое
утреннее падение
2. Купил акции - продал акции, машину, квартиру, дачу

3. Трейдер: "Это хуже, чем развод, блин! Я уже потерял половину своего состояния, а жена все еще осталась".
 
4. Рынок достиг дна и начал копать.

5. Чем инвестбанкир отличается от большой пиццы?
- Большая пицца еще может накормить вечером семью из четырех человек.
 
6. Инвестиционная стратегия от ведущих международных аналитиков: "Если бы вы купили на $1000 акций Дельта Эйрлайнс год назад, сейчас стоимость вашего пакета была бы - $194, с Фанни Мэй у вас бы осталось $2,50, а с АИГ - менее $15. Но если бы вы тогда купили на $1000 пива, выпили его и сдали аллюминиевые банки, у вас имелось бы $214 наличными. Основываясь на вышеизложенном, лучшей инвестиционной рекомендацией сейчас является: бухать жёстко и сдавать тару..."

7. О нашем фондовом рынке:
В мексиканскую деревню приехал бизнесмен: "Покупаю местных обезьян по 10 песо/шт". Обезьян вокруг море, все сдают приматов в розницу и оптом по 10 песо.
Обезьян стало меньше, тогда бизнесмен сказал, что повышает цену до 20 песо. Жители напряглись, изловили последних, принесли, сдали по 20. Самых последних забрал за 25, а потом объявил, что хочет еще и уже по 50! Но сам уехал и оставил за себя управляющего.
Управляющий говорит: "Давайте так, я сдаю вам втихую этих обезьян назад по 35, а когда босс приедет, вы их ему по 50+" Народ рад халяве такой назанимал кучу бабла и скупил всех обезьян обратно по 35.
На следующий день управляющий исчез вслед за боссом, а народ остался без денег, но зато при обезьянах.
 
8. Ну и только что сообщили, что на межбанковском рынке возобновлены операции с РЕПО. Килограмм РЕПО меняется на 2 кило БРЮКВО или полтора кило КАРТО урожая предыдущего года.
 
9. Один инвестбанкир сказал, что теперь сосредоточится только на крупных выпусках. Вчера он продал мне один на улице. Газетный.
 
10. Обзор фондового рынка 2009 года:
"Словосочетания "финансовый и фондовый крах" решено заменить в публикациях СМИ нейтральной аббревиатурой. Новое название будет выбрано всенародным голосованием. Пока в Интернет-проекте "Имя Кризиса" лидирует "Жалкое Околорыночное Падение Активов". ФСФР также участвует в регуляции паники. Служба рекомендует теперь называть снижение котировок акций на бирже "принуждением к справедливой цене"" (см. полный вариант обзора).
 
11. Обзор фондового рынка 2010 года:
"Тем временем курсы переквалификации закончили уже три тысячи финансовых аналитиков и инвестбанкиров. Они приобрели общественно полезные профессии продавцов круглосуточных магазинов, переборщиков картофеля и массажистов. Но некоторым подлецам по поддельным паспортам удалось все же скрыться в Исландии. Есть и позитивные новости - после очередного падения акций Олег Дерипаска сошел с ума и теперь развлекает публику в Манеже пением матерных частушек+ Посетившие его выступления отмечают сочный искренний голос и энергетику исполнителя. На фоне общего затишья бумаги Сбербанка в начале третьего квартала неожиданно пошли в резкий рост. Как выяснилось, они очень хорошо крутятся и смешно курятся даже без табака" (см. полную версию обзора).
 
Про банки и банкиров
 
1. Разговор в банке:
- Вы знаете, я хочу сделать небольшой бизнес+
- Что ж, купите большой и просто немного подождите.
 
2. Клиент в банке:
 - Знаете, я хотел бы положить деньги в ваш банк, к кому мне обратиться?
 - К психиатру!
 
3. Осенний день 2010 года, шесть утра. Встречаются два дворника. Один пристально смотрит на другого.
- У вас такое лицо знакомое!
- И я вас где-то видел... Вы в каком банке работали?
 
4. В банк приходит клиент деньги снять.
Кассир:
- Денег нет.
Клиент:
- Очень надо.
Кассир:
- Зачем?
Клиент:
- За квартиру заплатить.
Кассир:
- Оплатите переводом.
Клиент:
- Блин, я поесть хочу, дайте денег - пойду в ресторан.
Кассир:
- У вас же карточка есть. Оплатите ВИЗой, а денег мы вам не можем дать.
Клиент (надрывно):
- Отдайте мои деньги! Я, может, проститутку хочу снять!
Кассир (показывая рукой на операционисток):
- Пожалуйста, выбирайте!
 
5. Он работал в банке на Таганке,
У него был сейф и дырокол,
И портрет жены на фото в рамке
Украшал его рабочий стол.
Был он честен по российским меркам,
Не имел ни денег, ни врагов
Вот таким вот неприметным клерком
Шел по жизни Митя М*даков.
Но в одно прекрасное мгновенье,
Будто бы во сне или в бреду
В лифте с Председателем Правленья
Он столкнулся на Читать далее...

Архитектор, хирург и экономист обсуждают сотворение мира.
Хирург говорит: "Мы, хирурги, важнее всех. Бог - хирург, потому что первым делом извлек Еву из ребра Адама". Архитектор говорит: "Нет, Бог - архитектор, потому что сотворил мир за семь дней из хаоса".
Экономист говорит: "Ну, а кто придумал хаос?".

Принимайте абсурд таким, каков он есть, потому что если в
нем хоть что-нибудь изменить, то никакое явление не сможет
докатиться до своей крайности и жизнь перестанет быть
неповторимо интересной...

Это цитата сообщения fanatochka Оригинальное сообщение

-4018-

Можно заниматься грязным, развратным сексом, можно чистой возвышенной любовью, а можно тупо, как мы с тобой, трахать друг другу мозги!
(с)мечтать_опасно

FRBSF Economic Letter

2008-33; October 24, 2008

What Is Liquidity Risk?

All firms, particularly financial institutions, require access to borrowed funds to carry out their operations, from paying their near-term obligations to making long-term strategic investments. An inability to acquire such funding within a reasonable timeframe could place a firm at risk, as graphically shown by the recent demise of certain investment banks and other financial institutions. While such risks are endemic to financial institutions, increased financial globalization, the development of new financial instruments, and changing macroeconomic conditions have led to a renewed emphasis on the measurement and management of liquidity risk. In particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) recently reviewed and expanded its survey of sound practices for liquidity risk management by both banking organizations and their supervisors. This Economic Letter reviews and highlights key elements of liquidity risk measurement and management.

Definition

Liquidity is generally defined as the ability of a financial firm to meet its debt obligations without incurring unacceptably large losses. An example is a firm preferring to repay its outstanding one-month commercial paper obligations by issuing new commercial paper instead of by selling assets. Thus, "funding liquidity risk" is the risk that a firm will not be able to meet its current and future cash flow and collateral needs, both expected and unexpected, without materially affecting its daily operations or overall financial condition. Financial firms are especially sensitive to funding liquidity risk since debt maturity transformation (for example, funding longer-term loans or asset purchases with shorter-term deposits or debt obligations) is one of their key business areas.

In response to this well-known risk, financial firms establish and maintain liquidity management systems to assess their prospective funding needs and ensure the funds are available at appropriate times. A key element of these systems is monitoring and assessing the firm's current and future debt obligations and planning for any unexpected funding needs, regardless of whether they arise from firm-specific factors, such as a drop in the firm's collateral value, or from systemic (economy-wide) factors. To balance its funding demand, both expected and unexpected, with available supply, a firm must also incorporate its costs and profitability targets.

Financial firms can meet their liquidity needs through several sources ranging from existing assets to debt obligations and equity. The most readily available is operating cash flows arising from interest and principal payments from existing assets, service fees, and the receipt of funds from various transactions. For example, active management of the timing and maturity of firms' asset and liability cash flows can enhance liquidity. In addition, firms may sell assets that are near-term cash equivalents, such as government securities. This is typically done on a contingency basis to meet unexpected cash needs, and such liquidity reserves must be actively managed, since the assets must be unencumbered (that is, not pledged as collateral for any other transaction) and easy to liquidate under potentially adverse market conditions.

An important alternative to an outright asset sale is entry into a repurchase agreement with a willing counterparty. In such a "repo" transaction, the owner of an asset sells it to the buyer, but also enters into a separate agreement to buy the asset back at a specified time for a set price. From a funding perspective, the repo provides the seller with a short-term loan that is collaterized using the asset in question. The Federal Reserve's discount window is a venue for such repos based on specific asset types as collateral. Access to the discount window has historically been limited to depository institutions. However, in light of the ongoing liquidity challenges in the financial markets, the Federal Reserve has instituted a variety of additional collateralized lending facilities, such as the Term Auction Facility and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, that extend its ability to provide liquidity to a broader set of financial institutions based on a broader set of collateral types for a greater variety of maturities.

Asset securitization is a form of liquidity management carried out using asset sales, but it is different from the use of liquidity reserves. Securitization refers to the transformation of portfolios of on-balance-sheet loans, such as mortgages or credit card debt, into securities that are sold to outside investors. Depending on the business model, securitization proceeds can be used for ongoing funding of a business line or as a way to meet future funding needs. For example, a firm may view the potential securitization of a pool of mortgages as a method for funding its origination of new Читать далее...

Motorcycling: [moh-ter-sahy-kling] an activity of unnecessary risk made irrelevent by the overwhelming euphoria it causes.

Girl: Поздравляю!
Girl: Совет да любовь! :)
Спасибо!
Girl: Скотина
???
Юль, ты окошком ошиблась?
Girl: Нет
????
Girl: В контакте был не женат, красивый, серьезный, самостоятельный! Я дура с тобой полгода переписывалась! Депеш мод твой слушала! Киндзадзу твою смотрела! Велосипед купила! Ждала когда ты тормозить перестанешь! А ты вдруг женился и свадебные фотки выложил! У нее даже странички в контакте нет! Ненавижу!
Girl: не пиши мне больше


ПС: А намекнуть ?

Ну ее нафиг, ету зиму ... Проснулся в пять утра от того, что замерз. После работы, еду в стройматериалы закупаться утеплителями для квартиры. Пора в руки брать молоток и гвозди

Morningstar.com
Funds That Avoid Disaster
Wednesday October 8, 10:14 am ET
By John Coumarianos

Coulda, woulda, shoulda ... you can bet that regular investors and professionals alike are rehashing the past year or so, trying to figure out where they went wrong. It's not a new exercise; bear market after bear market, similar analyses are done.

But is there an investment approach that would have avoided the past two stock market debacles? If so, do any mutual funds employ anything like it? Is it dangerously unrealistic to think that you can completely avoid all market swoons anyway? We'll address these questions below by exploring a simple investment approach advocated by Benjamin Graham, who is widely considered one of the great investing minds.

The Common Denominator
The last two market meltdowns were basically caused by excess--excessive prices in the first case and excessive debt in the second case.

In early 2000, stock prices were simply too high. Led by high-expectation technology issues, prices were inflated through the late-1990s; consider that by early 2000, the S&P 500's price/earnings ratio exceeded 40. When fine but somewhat stodgy nontech companies such as Proctor & Gamble (NYSE:PG - News) sport P/E ratios in the 40s, as P&G did in 2000, things have gotten a bit out of whack. (By comparison, P&G now trades at a P/E of 19, and its five-year average P/E is 22.) The market, again led by technology stocks, imploded from early 2000 through 2002, when earnings failed to meet expectations.

The most recent meltdown, over the past year or so, has been led by bank stocks. They don't typically sport high P/E or price/book ratios, but instead use huge amounts of debt or leverage. One could argue that high prices caused this meltdown as well, because obviously no price is worth paying for financial institutions that will ultimately go bankrupt. But what caused some banks to become insolvent and worthless were massive amounts of debt and bad loans on their balance sheets.

Interestingly, the past two market debacles hurt different investment styles. During the technology debacle, growth funds paying seemingly any price for earnings growth got hurt the most, while apparently more sober value funds performed relatively well. During the current crisis, however, value funds ever-attracted to the low P/Es and P/Bs of financial stocks have taken it hard on the chin. Even seasoned market observers were surprised by how little downside protection these funds can provide when they're jam-packed with debt-laden banks.

Taking a lesson from each market meltdown, perhaps a perfect investment approach would be to buy stocks with low P/Es and little, or at least not suffocating, amounts of debt. Such an approach would avoid technology at most times and avoid banks (though not all financials) at all times.

The Graham Interview
It appears entirely too facile and even downright irresponsible to argue that one should avoid the two sectors that are the poster-children for the past two market disasters. Putting entire industries of the economy off-limits hinders full diversification. And in avoiding the most recently downtrodden sectors, investors could be ruling out the cheapest stocks available.

However, it's striking that Benjamin Graham, author of Security Analysis and Warren Buffett's teacher, advocated an investment approach, employable by both professional investors and regular folks, that effectively would have sidestepped the past two disasters. Graham actually didn't speak of specific sector or industry avoidance and certainly never argued for simply neglecting stocks that had been recently smashed, but late in his life he gave an interview where he argued for buying a basket of stocks (at least 30) with P/Es of 7 or less and an equity/asset ratio of 50% or more. The first criterion would keep you away from most tech stocks most of the time and likely all tech stocks in 2000. The second criterion would rule out all banks at all times.

Although a P/E of 7 seems arbitrary, Graham explained that a 7 P/E is actually a 14% earnings yield. An earnings yield is the inverse of a P/E; it's E/P or the amount of earnings you're theoretically getting as a percentage of the price you're paying. It's a convenient ratio, because it makes stocks at least somewhat comparable to bonds and other investments like real estate. So a 7 P/E really gives you an earnings yield (E/P or 1/7) of 14%, and Graham wanted 14% because that was double what the highest rated (AAA) corporate bonds were paying at the time of the interview. Graham thought an investor should be paid roughly twice the yield of the most secure bond for the risk of owning a common stock. Investors don't generally get paid out much of the earnings of a stock in the form of a cash dividend (though they do in case of real estate investment trusts), but the comparison is still apt; the earnings of a business theoretically belong to shareholders or Читать далее...

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Лёха-ха: единственный плюс холостяцкой жизни - всегда знаешь, чья сегодня очередь мыть посуду, стирать, готовить, пылесосить, гладить и т.д..

As oil prices have climbed over the last several years, the memory of the 1970s and early 1980s has not been far from the minds of the public or of monetary policymakers. In those earlier episodes, rising oil prices were accompanied by double-digit overall inflation in the U.S. and in several other developed economies. Indeed, central bankers say they are determined not to let this experience recur, emphasizing that they intend to maintain their credibility with the public in securing low inflation and achieving stable and well-anchored inflation expectations. In pursuing these goals, a key measure policymakers often focus on is core inflation; this may seem surprising, since core inflation excludes energy prices, among other things. However, one justification for looking at a measure that excludes energy prices is that they are typically quite volatile; for example, after rising steadily and hitting a record of about $145 per barrel in July, oil prices then fell to under $100 per barrel in September. Temporary oil price increases do not tend to pass through to the prices of non-energy goods and services when the central bank is crediblethat is, when inflation expectations are well-anchoredand, therefore, will not result in persistently higher overall inflation.

This Economic Letter examines the impact of rising oil prices on core inflation over the last decade for four economies: the U.S., the euro area, Canada, and the U.K. I find some evidence that rising oil prices have had a positive and significant effect on core inflation in the euro area, but I find no systematic evidence that rising oil prices have had a significant impact on core inflation in the U.S., Canada, or in the U.K.

How do rising oil prices affect the inflation rate?

Rising oil prices tend to affect the overall consumer price index (CPI) directly by raising its energy cost component, which includes the prices of energy-related items, such as household fuels, motor fuels, gas, and electricity. Among these, gasoline and fuel oil are directly derived from crude oil, so their prices follow oil prices very closely. An increase in the price of oil may also affect energy costs through the prices of other items that are close substitutes; for example, households and businesses may switch from oil-related energy items to natural gas, thus leading to an increase in its price. The extent to which rising oil prices translate into higher overall inflation through higher energy costs depends on their persistence. If they continue to rise, they may lead to sustained increases in the overall price level, that is, to an increase in the overall inflation rate.

Rising oil prices tend also to affect the core portion of the CPI indirectly, because energy prices represent a considerable portion of the production cost for many of the items in it, such as transportation services.  In addition, if workers have to pay higher energy prices themselves, they may bargain for compensating wage increases, which also increases the production costs of items in the core CPI. The extent to which rising oil prices translate into higher core inflation through higher production costs depends, among other things, on how much they break into the overall inflation expectations of those who set prices and wages. In fact, if rising oil prices lead to higher inflation expectations over the longer term, rising energy and wage costs are more likely to be passed through in terms of rising consumer prices. In this case, rising oil prices may lead to sustained increases in the core portion of the CPI, that is, to an increase in core inflation.

However, once oil prices stabilize, as they have in recent months, the corresponding inflationary pressures will dissipate. As a result, both overall and core measures of inflation may decline, with the overall inflation rate likely to fall towards the lower rate of core inflation.

Why focus on core inflation?

In their efforts to secure a low and stable inflation environment, and therefore limit the impact of inflationary pressures emanating from rising oil prices, monetary policymakers pay close attention to core inflation for several reasons.  One is that the exclusion of the volatile food and energy components makes it a more reliable indicator of the underlying trend in inflation. Fluctuations in the prices of food and energy may reflect exogenous shocks, that is, developments that are not inherent to the dynamics of the economyfor example, a drought may

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America Loses Its Dominant Economic Role

By SPIEGEL Staff

The banking crisis is upending American dominance of the financial markets and world politics. The industrialized countries are sliding into recession, the era of turbo-capitalism is coming to an end and US military might is ebbing. Still, this is no time to gloat.

There are days when all it takes is a single speech to illustrate the decline of a world power. A face can speak volumes, as can the speaker's tone of voice, the speech itself or the audience's reaction. Kings and queens have clung to the past before and humiliated themselves in public, but this time it was merely a United States president.

Or what is left of him.

George W. Bush has grown old, erratic and rosy in the eight years of his presidency. Little remains of his combativeness or his enthusiasm for physical fitness. On this sunny Tuesday morning in New York, even his hair seemed messy and unkempt, his blue suit a little baggy around the shoulders, as Bush stepped onto the stage, for the eighth time, at the United Nations General Assembly.

He talked about terrorism and terrorist regimes, and about governments that allegedly support terror. He failed to notice that the delegates sitting in front of and below him were shaking their heads, smiling and whispering, or if he did notice, he was no longer capable of reacting. The US president gave a speech similar to the ones he gave in 2004 and 2007, mentioning the word "terror" 32 times in 22 minutes. At the 63rd General Assembly of the United Nations, George W. Bush was the only one still talking about terror and not about the topic that currently has the rest of the world's attention.

"Absurd, absurd, absurd," said one German diplomat. A French woman called him "yesterday's man" over coffee on the East River. There is another way to put it, too: Bush was a laughing stock in the gray corridors of the UN.

The American president has always had enemies in these hallways and offices at the UN building on First Avenue in Manhattan. The Iranians and Syrians despise the eternal American-Israeli coalition, while many others are tired of Bush's Americans telling the world about the blessings of deregulated markets and establishing rules "that only apply to others," says the diplomat from Berlin.

But the ridicule was a new thing. It marked the end of respect.

"Well," Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva began, standing outside the General Assembly Hall. Then he looked out the window and said: "He decided to talk about terrorism, but the issue that has the world concerned is the economic crisis." Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the president of Argentina, said that the schoolmasters from Washington had dubbed the 1994 Mexican crisis the "tequila effect" and Brazil's 1999 crisis the "Caipirinha effect."

Are we now experiencing the "whiskey effect?" But President Kirchner was gracious and, with a smile, called it the "jazz effect."

Is it only President George W. Bush, the lame duck president, whom the rest of the world is no longer taking seriously, or are the remaining 191 UN member states already setting their sights on the United States, the giant brought to its knees? UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon referred to a "new reality" and "new centers of power and leadership in Asia, Latin America and across the newly developed world." Are they surprised, in these new centers, at the fall of America, of the system of the Western-style market economy?

Even America's closest allies are distancing themselves -- first and foremost the German chancellor. When push came to shove in the past, Angela Merkel had always come down on the side of the United States. As a candidate for the Chancellery for the conservative Christian Democrats, she helped Bush in the Iraq war, and as chancellor she supported tougher sanctions on Iran and campaigned in Europe for an embargo against Cuba. "The partnership with the United States," the chancellor insisted again and again, "has a very special meaning for us Germans."

There was no mention of loyalty and friendship last Monday. Merkel stood in the glass-roofed entrance hall of one of the German parliament's office buildings in Berlin and prepared her audience of roughly 1,000 businesspeople from all across Germany for the foreseeable consequences of the financial crisis. It was a speech filled with concealed accusations and dark warnings.

Merkel talked about a "distribution of risk at everyone's expense" and the consequences for the "economic situation in the coming months and possibly even years." Most of all, she made it clear who she considers the true culprit behind the current plight. "The German government pointed out the problems early on," said the chancellor, whose proposals to impose tighter international market controls failed repeatedly because of US opposition. "Some things can be done at the national level," she said, "but most things have to be handled Читать далее...

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